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Cropland tenants and landowners must agree on a type of contract when entering a lease. 
Historically, the two most popular types of contracts are cash rent and cropshare. What variables 
cause tenants and landowners to choose one type of contract over the other? Is it simply a 
random decision? Or are there tangible, identifiable, quantifiable factors that play a role?  
This thesis attempts to determine the most influential factors that affect contract choice. 
This is accomplished using a binomial logistic regression model with data from surveys 
distributed to nearly two thousand tenants in the Kansas Farm Management Association database 
and their landlords. While there were a few noticeable trends in the data, all tenant-landowner 
relationships and situations are unique. Because of this, individual factors cannot be said to be 
definitive predictors for a particular choice of contract. 
Results showed that the most influential factors for a tenant were whether or not the 
leased land was being used to grow hay crops, whether or not the leased land was irrigated, and 
the tenant’s annual household income. For landowners, the most notable factors of contract 
choice were found to be the number of tenants a landowner worked with, whether or not the 
tenant was family, the risk preference of the landowner, and the age of the landowner.  
These variables either fall into the category of transaction cost theory or risk sharing. 
Arguments have been made for both theories, and the results of this study lead to the conclusion 
that both transaction cost and risk sharing are viable theories with a noticeable impact on 
contract choice.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 There are many theories that have been discussed as to why either cash rent or cropshare 
contracts are chosen over the other in agricultural land leasing. Many different factors and 
perspectives must be considered. Unfortunately, it is difficult to investigate and there is little 
empirical research to back up these theories, due in part to the private nature of the parties in the 
lease contract. In addition, some of the studies that have been done are either not conducted in 
the United States or are becoming outdated. 
Cash rent is a type of contract where the tenant, or farmer, pays the landowner a fixed 
amount per acre and, in return, gets to keep the entire crop after harvest. Typically, the tenant is 
responsible for all input costs in a cash rent contract. In a cropshare contract, however, the tenant 
and landowner typically split the costs of inputs and, as the name suggests, share the crop. The 
harvested product is divided between the farmer and the landlord, so each get revenue by selling 
their portion of the total crop harvested. The specifics of cropshare contracts tend to differ for 
virtually every tenant and landowner. 
Each type of contract provides different incentives that may change the way a tenant 
farms the land or how the landowner manages the land. In a cash rent contract, the tenant 
receives all of the revenue from the harvested product, meaning the tenant would want to 
produce as much as possible. The farmer has the ability to take advantage of the landowner by 
overusing the key input the landowner has provided, the land. Continuous planting of a more 
profitable crop as opposed to proper crop rotation, using an extreme amount of chemicals and 
fertilizer that damage the soil quality, and using tillage practices that show immediate benefits 
but reduce long-term soil moisture are all ways that the farmer can try to increase short-term 
profits by increasing immediate crop production. If a fallow season is needed to preserve soil 
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moisture or prevent erosion, a cash rent tenant is less likely to cooperate, as there is no 
immediate monetary benefit for the farmer without producing a crop. The landowner will not see 
any increase or decrease in immediate profit, as the tenant is paying a fixed amount, but the 
land’s value may decrease due to the abuse. However, landowners can mitigate this risk by 
building relationships and leasing long-term to tenants so the farmer will benefit from caring for 
the land in the long run. If these negative practices are occurring, the landowner’s asset, the soil, 
will be damaged long-term. If the land is expected to be used for other purposes, such as urban 
development if near a city, the long-term negative effects of this practice will make less of an 
impact.  
However, with cropshare, the tenant must share the profits of the crop, so maximizing 
immediate success is less beneficial. The tenant would see less of an increase in income as they 
would only receive a portion of the product. The extra effort to maximize production is not as 
rewarding. Because of this, the farmer is less likely to exploit the landowner’s inputs. Land that 
is more sensitive to tillage when it comes to soil moisture or structure will likely result in 
cropshare contracts to reduce the likelihood of the farmer to consciously degrade the soil. 
Additionally, crops that typically require more tillage, such as row crops, as opposed to hay 
crops, are subject to more misuse by the farmer, resulting in cropshare as the assumed preferred 
contract by the landowner. In the event of extreme weather, a farmer will be more likely to tend 
to a crop that they own outright before a crop they must share. Another problem with cropshare 
contracts is underreporting. A farmer could potentially keep the highest quality grain while 
giving the landowner the lower quality, or the farmer could report a lower yield to the landowner 
and keep the surplus grain if the total production is not easily verifiable or quantifiable by the 
landowner. There may be costs associated with measuring and dividing the grain. Crops sold 
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publicly, such as grain at an elevator, are easier to monitor and measure than crops sold 
privately, such as bales of hay. On-farm storage is one way farmers may be able to get around 
the transparency and accuracy of public elevators, although it can be costly. The effect of these 
costs should be considered when deciding between cash rent and cropshare contracts. 
Unfortunately, these effects are difficult to quantify and measure. 
These costs can be considered incentives. For cash rent, the farmer has an incentive to 
overuse the inputs provided by the landowner in attempt to exploit the soil for immediate returns. 
In cropshare, the farmers are incentivized to underreport or to take better care of their own crops 
first. A flex lease is a third type of contract that is essentially a combination of a cash rent and a 
cropshare contract. These types of contracts are so rarely used that they were not analyzed in this 
study. 
An important implication to consider is that, in general, as crop division costs increase, 
the contract that will maximize value to both farmers and landowners changes from cropshare to 
cash rent. On the other hand, because land inputs are more overused in cash rent scenarios, as 
land attributes’ costs increase, the maximum value will shift from cash rent to cropshare. In other 
words, if land increases in value, a landowner will be more likely to prefer cropshare so that the 
farmer does not overuse and abuse the soil. The landowner and tenant must try to balance crop 
division costs and land attributes’ costs when determining which type of contract to use (Allen & 
Lueck, 1992). 
Another way that tenants and landowners form opinions on contract type is their risk 
preference. For tenants, the more risky contract is cash rent. In a cash rent contract, the tenant 
has no protection for a bad crop year and must pay the same rent regardless of yield or market 
prices. There are some cases where a cash rent lease may be adjusted based on yield or market 
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prices, but this does not appear to be common practice. For landowners, the more risky contract 
is cropshare. In a cropshare contract, there is more variance in landowner income, as the lease 
payment depends on the success of the crop. Landowners are guaranteed an agreed upon amount 
of income in a cash rent contract. In a situation where a tenant can afford to take on more risk 
and their landowner prefers little risk exposure, a cash rent contract may be more likely. Clearly, 
if both the tenant and landowner are risk averse, there is no obvious choice. Other factors must 
be considered to determine the appropriate contract type. 
This study attempts to determine the most influential characteristics of contract choice. A 
survey was sent out to tenants and landowners from the Kansas Farm Management Association 
database. Surveys were bundled with both the tenant and landowner surveys in one package and 
sent to every farmer in the database. The farmers were instructed to deliver the landowner survey 
to the landlord of their largest cropland lease. A total of 3,970 surveys were distributed, with a 
response rate of about 23 percent (26 percent of tenants and 20 percent of landowners). The 
surveys, seen in the Appendix, covered a broad range of information, and were primarily aimed 
at tenant-landowner relationships and gaining perspectives and opinions on aspects of 
government conservation programs. For this study, questions from the surveys were identified 
that would provide relevant information pertaining to contract choice between cropshare and 
cash rent. One particular question, which is the basis of this study, asked which type of contract 
tenants and landowners use for their largest lease. 
While the results are difficult to interpret, it is clear that both transaction cost theory and 
risk-sharing incentives are supported by this study. Both are important factors to consider when 
deciding on contract choice. Data from the tenant survey showed slightly more logical and 
conclusive results. This may be considered evidence that tenants actually have more decision 
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making power than landowners. Typically, tenants tend to think that landowners actually hold 




Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Contract Choice: Transaction Cost Theory 
One study in particular that stands out as being thoughtful, relevant and thorough was 
done by Douglas Allen and Dean Lueck, titled ‘Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash 
Rent versus Cropshare’. Allen and Lueck used data from Nebraska and South Dakota farms to 
build a model that interprets the incentives of each type of contract, in effort to determine how 
producers and landowners choose between cash rent and cropshare contracts. 
In other words, what factors motivate, incentivize and ultimately determine how 
landowners and producers agree upon each type of contract? The answer to this question can 
help farmers and landowners make more educated and informed choices in the future by 
analyzing specific factors of their own operations to maximize the potential return on their 
investment, whether it be a landowner investing in acreage, or a tenant investing in the crop of 
the current or upcoming years. The study was built on two stages. First, identifying the various 
choices available to a farmer, followed by determining the best contract type for the situation. 
It is important to note that their study assumed that all parties involved in the process 
were risk neutral. Ignoring risk sharing, Allen and Lueck based their study on transaction cost 
theory. They analyzed the key costs associated with each type of contract. This helped determine 
the important incentives that each contract provides. Multiple scenarios were identified that 
highlight the costs and reasoning for the contract type that is most suitable to each situation. 
 Logistic-regression was used to analyze the effects of these factors. The dependent 
variable showed ‘one’ if the contract chosen was cropshare and ‘zero’ if the contract chosen was 
cash rent. The variables selected for the regression include whether or not irrigation was used, 
whether or not the landowner was an institution, whether or not hay crops were exclusively 
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grown, whether or not row crops were exclusively grown, whether hay crops and row crops were 
both grown, population density, urbanization, number of acres, whether or not tenant and 
landowner were family, farm income, age, and whether or not the landowner was absent from the 
farm.  
Hay, irrigation, row crop and population density resulted in the expected signs, were 
statistically significant, and significantly affected the contract decision. As discussed before, hay 
requires little tillage and is more difficult to measure and monitor. Irrigated land protects soil 
from moisture exploitation, minimizing the negative effects of cash rent contracts. High 
population density decreases the long-term negative effect of soil abuse. These variables verified 
the expectation that cash rent contracts were more likely. Row crops require increased tillage, 
exposing the land to increased exploitation and abuse, which resulted in higher likelihood of 
cropshare contracts being chosen. 
Coefficients of some other variables were also correctly predicted, but lacked sufficient t-
statistics. Number of acres and farming of both hay and row crops resulted in coefficients not 
significantly different from zero. While insignificant, the expectation of cash rent being the 
preferred contract for institutions due to increased output-division costs was supported by the 
coefficient. Age and absent landowner’s coefficients were also insignificant. The model assumed 
that landowners only provide land and no other inputs or decisions. 
 Although the model assumed risk-neutrality, Allen and Lueck discussed the implications 
of considering risk preferences in determining contract choice. Cropshare contracts are assumed 
to be less risky for tenants, as there is less variance in income. Cropshare risk would be further 
reduced if revenue was shared as opposed to crops. Allen and Lueck claim that because 
landowners are typically farmers themselves, tenants and landowners share similar traits and 
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should share similar risk preferences. Because of this, farmers and landowners should have 
complete opposite incentives for each factor of contract choice. Farm income was a variable used 
to determine risk preference. As farm income becomes a larger share of their total income, 
producers should be more risk averse. Reducing risk goes back to the idea that farmers reduce 
risk by reducing income variance by choosing cropshare contracts and that landowners reduce 
risk by reducing income variance by choosing cash rent contracts. The results supported this 
idea. They also tested risk aversion by suggesting that crops with higher variability in yields 
would affect the contract choice. County-level yield data for six crops was used to investigate 
this claim. The hypothesis was that higher variability in crop yields meant riskier crops. The 
results reject this hypothesis. These conclusions were used to determine that risk is not a 
sufficient strategy to explain contract choice, and that transaction-cost is more useful. 
Allen and Lueck found that neither contract is necessarily better than the other. It all 
depends on the situation. For instance, on occasions when the cost of dividing the crop after 
harvest is low and the farmer’s ability to have a negative impact on the long-term productivity of 
the soil is high, cropshare is the most likely contract to be chosen. On the other hand, in 
situations where crop-division costs are high, cash rent will likely be the preferred solution. 
Additionally, cash rent contracts may include specific verbiage limiting the farmer’s ability to 
degrade the soil.  
 There is one way that cash rent contracts can be adjusted that reduces the incentive for 
farmers to overuse the soil. If yields are higher than expected or higher than usual, the cash rent 
can be adjusted upwards. The likelihood of using one of these contracts increases in situations 
where the farmers’ ability to abuse the land is high. If crops are expensive to divide or easy to 
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underreport, these adjustment clauses are less likely, as it requires accurate measurement of 
output.  
 In conclusion, Allen and Lueck confirmed that using the transaction cost approach is an 
effective tool to determine the deciding factors of contract choice. The downside to this approach 
is that many of these factors are not fully measurable, making difficult to use the results of this 
study to predict future contract choices or determine the appropriate contract. The article perhaps 
summed it up best by saying, “If economists could directly and cheaply measure the ability of 
farmers to exploit the soil moisture and nutrients or the number and quality of hay bales taken, 
then so could landowners, and there would be no contract-design problem.” In other words, 
economists can only do so much to make inferences about driving factors, but cannot offer full-
proof solutions to solve all of the contract choice problems or answer all questions. Identifying 
the incentives present in particular situations is the best way to draw conclusions about what the 
best contract fit may be. There is no supporting evidence in this article that risk-aversion is an 
effective theory to determine contract choice. The results of the study found that hay crops, 
irrigated crops, and crops grown near densely populated areas all increase the likelihood of a 
cash rent contract being chosen. Growing row crops increases the likelihood that a cropshare 
contract will be chosen. This study was done in 1992. As agriculture has seen changes in recent 
decades, contract choice may be driven by other factors or may have experienced changing 
trends. 
2.2 Risk-Sharing Incentives 
There are other approaches to consider when researching contract choice. In 2011, Feng 
Qiu, Barry K. Goodwin, and Jean-Philippe Gervais studied the effect of government payments 
and government program enrollments on contract choice in An Empirical Investigation of the 
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Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements. It is critical to 
note that this study considers risk-sharing incentives to be important in determining contract 
choice. They suggest that it is necessary to consider the growing popularity of hybrid contracts, 
or flex leases, a mix of cash rent and cropshare of sorts. Essentially, the results show that 
different government programs have varying effects on contract choice, but can play a role. 
Results from The Role of Risk and Transaction Costs in Contract Design: Evidence from 
Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture, an article written by Keita Fukunaga and Wallace 
E. Huffman in 2009, support both the theory of risk-sharing incentives and transaction costs 
playing a role in contract choice. Major factors observed in this study include crop type, region, 
tenant and landlord age and race, number of tenants or landlords, location of landlords, farm 
income, farm share of total income, and debt. Some of these variables can be interpreted as 




Chapter 3 – Model 
3.1 Binomial Logistic Regression 
 Data was analyzed using two binomial logistic regressions. One regression analyzed the 
variables from the tenant survey, while the other regression analyzed variables from the 
landowner survey. The dependent variable was the type of contract used. If the contract used was 
a cropshare contract, the variable was shown as a “1”. If the contract was a cash rent contract, the 
variable was shown as a “0”. There were several factors to consider as independent variables. 
Tenant variables used were whether or not a tenant leases from more than 7 landlords, 
shown as “num_landlords”, whether or not a primary crop grown in the largest lease is a hay 
crop, shown as “hay”, whether or not a primary crop in the largest lease is irrigated, shown as 
“irr”, the annual household income of the tenant, shown as “income”, and the region of the state 
in which the tenant’s largest lease is located, shown as “region”. These variables are shown in 
Table 3.1. Tenant Model: 
 
Logit(CS) = α + β1num_landlords + β2hay + β3irr + β4income + β5region 
 
The variables used for the landowner regression were the total number of leased acres, 
shown as “leased_acres”, the number of tenants the landowner has leases with, shown as 
“num_tenants”, whether or not the landowner’s residence is further than 50 miles from their 
largest lease, shown as “distance_residence”, whether or not the tenant is family of the 
landowner, shown as “family”, the risk preference of the landowner, shown as “risk”, the age of 
the landowner, shown as “age”, and the region of the state in which the landowner’s largest lease 
is located, shown as “region”. Landowner variables are shown in Table 3.2. These independent 
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variables were used in the binomial logistic regressions to quantify the amount of influence they 
have on determining whether or not a cropshare contract will be used. Landowner Model: 
 
Logit(CS) = α + β1leased_acres + β2num_tenants + β3distance_residence 
+ β4family + β5risk + β6age + β7region 
 
3.2 Tenant Variables 
 Tenants that work with more than seven landlords are more likely to prefer using a cash 
rent contract. Cash rent contracts tend to be much simpler than cropshare contracts. There is no 
sharing of input costs, or dividing of output after harvest. Cash rent contracts have lower 
transaction costs than cropshare. A tenant with multiple cropshare contracts may have varying 
proportions of input costs covered by each landowner. The same can be said for the amount of 
crops shared after harvest. It requires much more time and effort for a tenant to keep record of 
input costs associated with each separate lease, as well as billing and receiving payments from 
each landowner in a timely and efficient manner. Once a tenant is working with several 
landlords, it makes more sense for the tenant to only have to worry about writing a check for 
each landowner once a month for a fixed cash rent. 
 If one of the top three crops grown in a tenant’s largest lease is a hay crop, the contract 
more likely to be chosen is cash rent. Bales of hay are typically sold in a private manner, as 
opposed to selling grain at an elevator. Private sales are more difficult to accurately record and 
track. Because of this, a tenant has a greater ability to understate production volume in order to 
keep a greater portion of the revenue for themselves, instead of splitting the crop in the quantities 
agreed upon in a cropshare contract. Hay may also vary in quality, allowing the tenants to 
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potentially keep the higher quality bales to themselves. For this reason, a landowner will be more 
likely to require a cash rent contract. Verifying production quantity and quality increases 
transaction costs. Hay crops such as alfalfa require less tillage than row crops, meaning there is 
less of a reason for the tenant to employ extensive or harmful tillage practices that can damage 
the soil long-term in an attempt to maximize short term production. This allows the landowner to 
be more comfortable with using a cash rent lease.  
 A tenant is more likely to prefer a cash rent contract for irrigated acres. Most often, a 
farmer will grow row crops on irrigated ground. Row crops typically require a higher amount of 
tillage, which can be damaging to soils and decrease long-term soil moisture, but irrigation 
minimizes this affect. Irrigation also provides some amount of guarantee that a decent crop will 
be grown, barring any extreme circumstances. Dryland crop yields are subject to more volatility 
due to uncontrollable moisture content throughout the season. Because there is a certain degree 
of guaranteed minimum yields, a tenant may opt towards a cash rent contract, because there is 
less risk of having to pay a flat rate in the event of an unsuccessful crop. This puts the irrigation 
variable in the risk-sharing category. A tenant will also benefit from not having to share the 
output of a consistently high producing crop.  
 The higher the annual household income of the tenant, the more likely the contract 
chosen will be cash rent. Income falls into the risk-sharing category. The higher income allows 
the tenant to have a higher preference for risk. Cash rent contracts are riskier for a tenant because 
in a bad crop year with less income, the cash rent payment remains the same. In a cropshare 
contract, the amount of crop output that goes to the landowner decreases with yield loss, costing 
the tenant less, making a cropshare contract less risky. In a good year, a tenant may be able to 
make more in a cash rent contract than in a cropshare contract because none of the output is 
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going to the landowner. In a cash rent contract on a good year, once the value of the crop that 
would typically go to the landowner in a cropshare situation surpasses the value of the cash rent, 
the tenant essentially wins. In a cropshare contract on a good year, the tenant loses if the value of 
the crop going to the landowner is more than what the cash rent would have been. Tenants with 
high income can afford to risk paying cash rent on a bad year, in hopes that they will receive 
greater benefits by retaining all of the crop outputs in good years. In addition, off-farm income 
can be the primary source of higher household income, resulting in the opportunity for a tenant 
to assume higher risk with farm operations. Tenant household incomes are divided into six 
categories. The survey allowed the tenants to express whether they made less than $25,000, 
between $25,000 and $50,000, between $50,000 and $80,000, between $80,000 and $100,000, 
between $100,000 and $150,000, or greater than $150,000. 
The region variable is essentially a control variable. Each region in Kansas grows their 
own unique combination of crops. Regions were determined using Kansas’ crop reporting 
districts for this study, shown in Figure 3.1. Some regions have more access to irrigation, while 
some regions receive more rainfall. Some regions have sandier soils than others. These and many 
other characteristics cause regions to differ in crops grown, such as more hay crops or row crops. 
Because so many different aspects, such as climate, soil type, landscape and more, determine 
what crops are grown, it is difficult to predict what type of contract will be used based solely on 
region. Two tenant-landowner relationships could be on complete opposite sides of the spectrum, 
one that clearly makes the most sense for cropshare and one for cash rent, and be located in the 
same region. Even if region isn’t the driving force behind contract choice, there may still be 
differing trends in contract choice between regions. This logic applies to both tenant contract 
preference and landowner contract preference. This variable was not intended to result in an 
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interpretation of a significant contributing factor to contract choice. Therefore, no predictions 
were made regarding the coefficient sign of this variable. 
 
Table 3.1 Tenant Variables with Expected Coefficient Sign (+/-) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   num_landlords = Tenant works with 8+ landlords (-) 
   hay = Whether or not hay is one of top three crops grown in largest lease (-) 
   irr = Whether or not any of the top three crops are irrigated (-) 
   income = Tenant’s total annual household income (-) 
   region = Area of Kansas based on Crop Reporting Districts compared to NW Kansas 
      20 = West Central Kansas 
      30 = South West Kansas 
      40 = North Central Kansas 
      50 = Central Kansas 
      60 = South Central Kansas 
      70 = North East Kansas 
      80 = East Central Kansas 
      90 = South East Kansas 
 
 
3.3 Landowner Variables 
 The more acres a landowner leases, the more likely the landowner is to prefer cash rent 
contracts. A larger farm means there are more crops to monitor and divide in a cropshare 
contract, which can be costly and time consuming. Higher acres may also mean a higher number 
of tenants, though this is not guaranteed. These reasons place this variable in the transaction cost 
category. Farm size could also be seen as a risk-sharing factor. The larger the farm, the more 
income can be affected by a bad crop year, proportionally. To minimize risk, a landowner may 
prefer cash rent contracts.  
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 Similar to before, the more tenants a landowner works with, the more likely cash rent 
contracts will be used. If each tenant requires the landowner to pay different amounts of input 
costs, then each additional tenant requires more time and effort by the landowner. Landowners 
must also verify the appropriate amounts of crop output are received, as well as fair quality. At 
some point, the landowner will not have enough resources to keep track of every detail of each 
cropshare contract, making cash rent the contract of choice. The number of tenants is a 
transaction cost issue. Although cash rent may be preferred, it may not be the best fit for every 
tenant. As mentioned, some tenants may have tendencies to abuse cash rent contracts by 
overusing inputs and might require a certain amount of attention from the landowner to ensure 
that the land is not being exploited. A cropshare contract also decreases the incentive and reward 
to a tenant who has these tendencies. In these cases, the landowner may choose to use a 
cropshare contract with unfavorable tenants to deter the negative incentives provided by cash 
rent contracts.  
 If a landowner’s residence is greater than 50 miles from their largest lease, the landowner 
is more likely to prefer cash rent contracts. Landowners that use cropshare contracts tend to be 
more involved in decision making and day to day operations. Cropshare landowners are more 
involved because their revenue depends on the success of the crop, as opposed to cash rent 
landowners earning revenue regardless of how well the crop produces. The ability of a 
landowner to be involved in the process diminishes when the landowner resides further away 
from the cropland. The closer the landowner lives to the leased land, the greater their ability to 
be present and informed. It is more costly for the landowner to use a cropshare contract when 
absent, because it is more difficult to be involved and to verify tenant reports on crop output, 
placing this variable into the category of transaction cost theory. 
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 If a landowner and tenant are family, the contract more likely to be chosen is a cropshare 
contract. Most likely, a landowner and a tenant that are family will have a relationship that 
results in the landowner being more involved in the decision making or at least more aware of 
the day to day status of the operation. If a landowner has family members involved in farming, 
the landowner has more than likely been involved in farming themselves, or has been exposed to 
it in some way. Because of this, the landowner will likely be more knowledgeable about farming, 
and able to contribute more in a cropshare scenario. In general, family members are more 
supportive of one another, and less likely to only be worried about themselves. There is a level of 
trust. Because of this, each party will be more willing to take on and share risk. This does not 
mean that using a cropshare contract with family decreases risk to the landowner. Cropshare 
contracts are still inherently more risky, but being family causes the landowner to be more 
willing to share risk with the tenant. Because of this, the family variable does not fit into either 
the transaction cost or the risk-sharing theory. Cropshare contracts allow both parties to work 
together to maximize production and for everyone involved to prosper. In many ways this comes 
more natural to family members. Of course, this may also cause families to overlook critical 
details or to think illogically, which may result in a situation where cash rent is never considered, 
even if it is the appropriate choice. 
 The higher the landowner’s risk preference, the more likely the contract chosen will be 
cropshare. As discussed before, cropshare contracts are riskier for landowners because on a bad 
crop year, revenue can be severely hurt, where a cash rent contract guarantees a level of income. 
If a landowner is tends to take more financial risks, they may be more likely to prefer a cropshare 
contract in hopes that the crop will produce high yields and provide a higher return to the 
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landowner than a cash rent rate, at the risk of income being hurt due to a failed crop. This 
variable falls in the risk-sharing category. 
 The older a landowner is, the more likely the landowner will prefer a cash rent contract. 
This is largely based off of risk. In theory, the older someone gets, the less risky they become. 
This is common in all financial decisions, including retirement funds and investments. If a 
landowner becomes less risky with age, the more likely they are to prefer the guaranteed and 
steady income of a cash rent contract. In addition, old age may prevent a landowner from being 
able to be involved in the farming process, making it harder for them to justify a cropshare 
contract. 
 
Table 3.2 Landowner Variables with Expected Coefficient Sign (+/-) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   leased_acres = Total number of acres leased (-) 
   num_tenants = Number of tenants a landowner works with (-) 
   distance_residence = Whether or not landowner residence is more than 50 miles from lease (-) 
   family = Whether or not the tenant is a family member of the landowner (+) 
   risk = Landowner willingness to take on financial risk on scale of 1-10 (+) 
   age = Years of age of landowner (-) 
   region = Area of Kansas based on Crop Reporting Districts compared to NW Kansas 
      20 = West Central Kansas 
      30 = South West Kansas 
      40 = North Central Kansas 
      50 = Central Kansas 
      60 = South Central Kansas 
      70 = North East Kansas 
      80 = East Central Kansas 
      90 = South East Kansas 





Because the model is based on a binomial logistic regression, if the coefficient for each 
independent variable is found to be negative, this means that an increase in the independent 
variable, for all continuous variables, is more likely to influence the contract chosen to be cash 
rent. If the coefficient is positive, the contract more likely to be chosen with an increase in the 
independent variable is cropshare. If the independent variable is also binary, then the presence of 
the variable results in the variable showing “1”, or “0” if the variable is not present. For instance, 
hay crops are either grown (“1”) or not grown (“0”). If the coefficient of these binomial 
independent variables is negative, the presence of that variable is more likely to influence the 
contract chosen to be cash rent. If the coefficient is positive, the presence of the variable causes 
the contract more likely to be chosen to be cropshare. The binomial variables are denoted by “1.” 
before their variable name in the results. 
 





Chapter 4 – Data 
4.1 KFMA Survey 
 Data was used from a survey of tenants and landowners. The survey was not created 
specifically for this study. Rather, this study was created based off of the potential to answer 
additional research questions using the survey. Contact information was from the Kansas Farm 
Management Association database, which only gives us access to tenants. Surveys were 
distributed to 1,985 tenants. The survey was distributed using a snowball method. Tenants were 
sent both a copy of a tenant survey and a landowner survey. Tenants were then instructed to 
deliver the landowner survey to the landowner of their largest lease. The tenants and landowners 
would then return the completed surveys directly back to the surveyor. There were 3,970 surveys 
sent out in total, with responses from 513 tenants and 398 landowners. 
The surveys for each group, while similar, were not identical and asked questions specific 
to each party. There were many important questions from this survey that could be used to derive 
the reasoning behind contract choice. The questions pertaining to the factors determined to be 
most influential on contract choice were used for this experiment. Tenants may have leases with 
multiple landowners, while a landowner may have leases with many tenants. Tenants and 
landowners were each asked what type of contract they use for their largest lease, be it cropshare, 
cash rent, or flex lease. About 35 percent of tenants were using cropshare contracts for their 
largest lease, about 60 percent used fixed cash rent, and about 5 percent used flex lease contracts. 
For the landowners, cropshare contracts made up about 40 percent of the contracts used, cash 
rent consisted of about 58 percent, and flex lease contracts made up the remaining 2 percent. 
While there were over 500 tenant responses and nearly 400 landowner responses, not every 
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respondent answered every question in the survey. Because of this, sample size for some 
questions are less than others.   
 Relevant tenant information from the survey includes the number of landowners that a 
tenant has leases with, the region of the state in which the tenant’s largest lease is located, 
whether or not a primary crop grown in the largest lease is a hay crop, whether or not a primary 
crop in the largest lease is irrigated, and the annual household income of the tenant. 
 The landowner survey also provided important information, such as the total number of 
acres leased, the number of tenants the landowner has leases with, the distance between the 
largest lease and the landowner’s residence, whether or not the tenant is family of the landowner, 
the risk preference of the landowner, the age of the landowner, and the region of the state in 
which the landowner’s largest lease is located.  
Shown in Table 1.1, 124 tenants reported cropshare as the contract type for their primary 
lease. 212 farmers used cash rent, while 17 used flex leases. For landowners, 63 reported using 
cropshare, 92 used cash rent, and 4 used flex leases, as seen in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 4.1 Tenant Contract Type 
  Frequency Percent 
Cropshare 128 35.36 
Cash Rent 216 59.67 
Flex Lease 18 4.97 
Total 362 100 
 
Table 4.2 Landowner Contract Type 
  Frequency Percent 
Cropshare 63 39.62 
Cash Rent 92 57.86 
Flex Lease 4 2.52 




4.2 Data Summary Tenants 
 From the tenant survey, the number of landowners each tenant works with ranged from 1-
70, with an average of 7.3 landowners, shown in Table 4.3. This variable was categorized to 
account for a skewed distribution. The new variable considers whether or not a tenant leases 
from more than seven landowners. About 34 percent of tenants leased from eight landowners or 
more, while about 66 percent lease from seven or fewer, shown in Table 4.4. Of tenants with 
eight or more landlords, 37 percent used a cropshare contract, shown in Table 4.9. 
Based on crop reporting districts for the location of each of the tenant’s largest lease, 5.87 
percent was located in north west Kansas, 2.23 percent was located in west central Kansas, 4.47 
percent was located in south west Kansas, 9.78 percent was located in north central Kansas, 
16.76 percent was located in central Kansas, 15.64 percent was located in south central Kansas, 
11.73 percent was located in north east Kansas, 15.64 was located in east central Kansas, and 
17.88 percent was located in south east Kansas, shown in Table 4.8. 
Hay crops were one of the top three crops grown in a tenant’s largest lease only 3.93 
percent of the time (17 out of 433), shown in Table 4.5. Of these instances, cropshare contracts 
were used 65 percent of the time (11 out of 17), shown in Table 4.10. At least one of the top 
three crops grown in a tenant’s largest lease was irrigated in 59.12 percent of tenants (256 out of 
433), shown in Table 4.6. Of the leases with irrigation, 30 percent used a cropshare contract (54 
out of 179 who answered both the contract type question and the irrigation question), shown in 
Table 4.11. 
Of the annual household income of all tenants, 6.09 percent was below $25,000, 15.24 
percent was between $25,000-$50,000, 24.93 percent was between $50,000-$80,000, 11.36 
percent was between $80,000-$100,000, 20.78 percent was between $100,000-$150,000, and 
23 
 
21.61 percent was above $150,000, shown in Table 4.7. Distribution of income and use of 
cropshare contracts are shown in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.3 Number of Landlords 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 1 1 
5% 1 1 
10% 2 1 
25% 3 1 
   
50% 5  
  Largest 
75% 9 27 
90% 15 41 
95% 18 57 
99% 27 70 
Obs.   357 
Mean  7.3026 
Std. Dev.   6.9713 
 
 
Table 4.4 Tenant Leases from 8+ Landlords (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 236 66.11 
1 121 33.89 
Total 357 100 
 
 
Table 4.5 Hay is Grown (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 416 96.07 
1 17 3.93 








Table 4.6 Irrigation is Used (0=No, 1=Yes) 
  Frequency Percent 
0 177 40.88 
1 256 59.12 




Table 4.7 Tenant Annual Household Income ($) 
  Frequency Percent 
<25K 22 6.09 
25K-50K 55 15.24 
50K-80K 90 24.93 
80K-100K 41 11.36 
100K-150K 75 20.78 
>150K 78 21.61 
Total 361 100 
 
 
Table 4.8 Region (Tenants) 
  Frequency Percent 
10 23 6.23 
20 8 2.17 
30 17 4.61 
40 35 9.49 
50 62 16.80 
60 58 15.72 
70 44 11.92 
80 59 15.99 
90 63 17.07 
Total 369 100 
 
 
Table 4.9 Number of Landlords and Cropshare  
Cropshare: 8+ Landlords (0=No, 1=Yes):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 Total 
0 136 71 207 
1 81 42 123 




Table 4.10 Hay and Cropshare   
Cropshare: Hay Grown (0=No, 1=Yes):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 Total 
0 210 6 216 
1 117 11 128 
Total 327 17 344 
 
 
Table 4.11 Irrigation and Cropshare  
Cropshare: Irrigation Used (0=No, 1=Yes):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 Total 
0 91 125 216 
1 74 54 128 




Table 4.12 Income and Cropshare      
Cropshare: Annual Household Income ($):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) <25K 25K-50K 50K-80K 80K-100K 100K-150K >150K Total 
0 15 33 41 19 39 37 184 
1 5 15 29 13 20 30 112 




4.3 Data Summary Landowners 
 From the landowner survey, the total number of leased acres ranged from 0-8,230 acres. 
The average number of leased acres was 842 acres, shown in Table 4.13. The number of tenants 
each landowner worked with ranged from 0-10 tenants, with an average of 1.34 tenants, shown 
in Table 4.14. A distribution of number of tenants is shown in Table 4.15. This range was 
notably less than the number of landlords that tenants worked with. The number of tenants a 
landowner works with and their contract type is shown in Table 4.22. 
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The distance between the landowner’s residence and their largest lease ranged from 0-
1,600 miles, with an average of 59 miles, shown in Table 4.16. This variable was categorized to 
account for skewed data. The new variable shows whether or not a landowner’s residence is 50 
miles or further from their largest lease. 12 percent of landowners reside 50 miles or further from 
their largest lease, shown in Table 4.17. Table 4.23 shows the number of landowners residing 50 
miles or more from their largest lease that use cropshare contracts. 
Based on crop reporting districts for the location of each of the landowner’s majority of 
owned cropland, 7.41 percent was located in northwest Kansas, 1.23 percent was located in west 
central Kansas, 8.02 percent was located in southwest Kansas, 7.41 percent was located in north 
central Kansas, 15.43 percent was located in central Kansas, 17.90 percent was located in south 
central Kansas, 11.72 percent was located in northeast Kansas, 16.67 percent was located in east 
central Kansas, 13.58 percent was located in southeast Kansas, and 0.62 percent was located out-
of-state, shown in Table 4.18. 
Thirty-one percent of all landowners were family with the tenant of their largest lease, 
shown in Table 4.19. Among these, 38 percent of landowners who were family with their tenant 
used a cropshare contract, shown in Table 4.24. On the other hand, of landowners who were not 
family with their tenant, only 11 percent used a cropshare contract. 
When asked to rate their willingness to take financial risks on a scale of 1-10, 2.89 
percent answered 1, 1.44 percent answered 2, 5.78 percent answered 3, 4.69 percent answered 4, 
14.08 percent answered 5, 9.75 percent answered 6, 19.86 percent answered 7, 21.66 percent 
answered 8, 9.03 percent answered 9, and 10.83 percent answered 10, shown in Table 4.20. Risk 
preference and contract type is shown in Table 4.25. Landowner age ranged from 31 to 96 years 
of age, with an average age of 69 years, shown in Table 4.21.  
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Table 4.13 Total Leased Acres 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 51 32 
5% 96.5 51 
10% 142 74 
25% 289 78 
   
50% 610  
  Largest 
75% 1002.5 2700 
90% 1925 3200 
95% 2241.5 6600 
99% 6600 8230 
Obs   160 
Mean  841.68 




Table 4.14 Number of Tenants 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0 0 
5% 1 0 
10% 1 0 
25% 1 0 
   
50% 1  
  Largest 
75% 1 3 
90% 2 5 
95% 3 5 
99% 5 10 
Obs   155 
Mean  1.3419 








Table 4.15 Number of Tenants 
















10 1 0.65 




Table 4.16 Distance to Landowner Residence (miles) 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0 0 
5% 0 0 
10% 0 0 
25% 0 0 
   
50% 5  
  Largest 
75% 15 940 
90% 80 1250 
95% 260 1400 
99% 1400 1600 
Obs   162 
Mean  58.7901 




Table 4.17 Landowner Residence 50+ Miles from Lease (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 143 87.65 
1 20 12.35 








Table 4.18 Region (Landowner) 
  Frequency Percent 
10 12 7.41 
20 2 1.23 
30 13 8.02 
40 12 7.41 
50 25 15.43 
60 29 17.9 
70 19 11.73 
80 27 16.67 
90 22 13.58 
100 1 0.62 




Table 4.19 Tenant is Family (0=No, 1=Yes) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 214 69.03 
1 96 30.97 




Table 4.20 Willingness to Take Financial Risk (1=Unwilling, 10=Willing) 
  Frequency Percent 
1 8 2.89 
2 4 1.44 
3 16 5.78 
4 13 4.69 
5 39 14.08 
6 27 9.75 
7 55 19.86 
8 60 21.66 
9 25 9.03 
10 30 10.83 






Table 4.21 Landowner Age 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 31 31 
5% 48 31 
10% 53 31 
25% 62 34 
   
50% 69  
  Largest 
75% 77 92 
90% 85 93 
95% 88 93 
99% 93 96 
Obs   282 
Mean  68.6277 




Table 4.22 Number of Tenants and Cropshare     
Cropshare: Number of Tenants   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 2 3 5 10 Total 
0 3 72 15 3 1 0 94 
1 1 41 15 2 1 1 61 
Total 4 113 30 5 2 1 155 
 
 
Table 4.23 Distance to Residence and Cropshare  
Cropshare: Residence 50+ Miles Away (0=No, 1=Yes):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 Total 
0 87 13 100 
1 55 7 62 








Table 4.24 Family and Cropshare   
Cropshare: Tenant is Family (0=No, 1=Yes):   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 Total 
0 190 57 247 
1 24 39 63 
Total 214 96 310 
 
 
Table 4.25 Risk and Cropshare          
Cropshare: Willingness to Accept Financial Risk   
(0=No, 1=Yes) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
0 5 1 12 13 29 18 43 50 21 28 220 
1 3 3 4 0 10 9 12 10 4 2 57 






Chapter 5 – Results 
Binomial logistic regressions tend to be a bit difficult to interpret. Regression coefficients 
in a logit function show the amount of change in the predicted log odds of cropshare contracts 
being used that would be predicted by a one unit increase in the independent variable, holding all 
other variables constant. In other words, they are the logarithm of the odds of the dependent 
variable occurring with a change in the independent variable. To make this coefficient easier to 
interpret, the log odds are exponentiated, resulting in odds ratios. An odds ratio is interpreted as 
the odds of cropshare being chosen when the independent variable is changing divided by the 
odds of cropshare being chosen when no change occurs. P-Values are used to test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient will be zero. For this experiment, if variables have a P-Value less 
than 0.1, the null hypothesis is rejected and the variables are considered significantly different 
from zero. However, so if a coefficient has a P-Value relatively close to 0.1, it may still be 
considered reasonably significant. 
The results of these regressions were especially difficult to interpret, as there were several 
variables that resulted in coefficients opposite of the predicted sign as well as several variables 
shown to be not statistically significant. Not counting region, the tenant regression resulted in 
three of four variables being statistically significant (hay, irrigation and income), while two of 
the four variables produced coefficients that followed the intuition and matched the predicted 
sign (number of landlords and irrigation). These results can be seen in Table 5.1. 
The landowner results were even more counterintuitive. One variable out of six (number 
of tenants) is considered statistically significant, while three more variables’ P-Values are 
reasonably close (family, risk and age). Only three of six variables matched the predicted 
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coefficient sign and aligned with intuition (leased acres, family and age). Landowner results are 
shown in Table 5.2. 
5.1 Tenant Results 
According to regression output, if a tenant works with more than seven landlords, the 
more likely they were found to use a cash rent contract, shown by a negative coefficient. This 
was expected, as cropshare contracts require more attention to ensure both parties are providing 
their inputs and receiving their fair share of outputs. Because of this, transaction costs are higher 
for cropshare contracts than cash rent contracts when increasing the number of landlords. 
Leasing from a higher number of landowners means the obvious contract choice will be cash rent 
to avoid the extra work. The value of the coefficient means that a tenant leasing from eight or 
more landlords resulted in a decrease of 0.055 in the log odds of cropshare contracts being 
chosen compared to a tenant that leases from seven or less landlords. Converting the log odds to 
an odds ratio results in an odds ratio of 0.946, or 1/1.057. Because this odds ratio is less than one, 
this means the more likely contract to be chosen is cash rent. The odds ratio says that the odds of 
cropshare contracts being chosen are greater when no change to the number of landlords occurs. 
However, the P-Value for the number of landlords a tenant works with was 0.840, meaning the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
The first variable with an unexpected sign was whether or not a hay crop is grown. The 
variable was predicted to be negative, which would indicate that growing a hay crop would result 
in the more likely contract being cash rent. However, the results show that the presence of a hay 
crop increased the log odds of using a cropshare contract by 1.325. Converting the log odds to an 
odds ratio results in an odds ratio of 3.764, or 3.764/1. Because this odds ratio is greater than 
one, this means the more likely contract to be chosen is cropshare. The odds ratio says that the 
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odds of cropshare contracts being chosen are greater with the presence of hay crops. As noted in 
the data summary, only 3.55 percent of tenants reported a hay crop as one of their top three crops 
grown in the previous year. Of these, just over half used cropshare contracts. I suspect there was 
simply not a large enough pool of data to effectively determine the impact of hay crops. Also, a 
hay crop may have been grown that particular year but may not regularly be a top three crop on 
the farm, while the cropshare may be the contract used in a more long-term fashion. This 
variable was statistically significant, with a P-Value of 0.020. 
Irrigated crops were found to result in cash rent contacts being more likely than 
cropshare, as predicted. A tenant can experience many benefits to having an irrigated crop under 
a cash rent contract, as they are basically guaranteed a more productive crop and both the tenant 
and landowner do not have to worry about reducing soil moisture by overusing tillage practices. 
A tenant is exposed to less risk than when farming dryland, as their yields are somewhat 
protected by the irrigation. Because of this, a tenant can afford to take on more risk with a cash 
rent contract. The value of the coefficient means using irrigation resulted in a decrease of 0.619 
in the log odds of cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a tenant does not irrigate. 
Converting the log odds to an odds ratio results in an odds ratio of 0.539, or 1/1.857. Because 
this odds ratio is less than one, this means the more likely contract to be chosen is cash rent. The 
odds ratio says that the odds of cropshare contracts being chosen are greater when no irrigation is 
used. The P-Value for irrigation was 0.018, meaning it was also statistically significant. 
 An increase in tenant income resulted in cropshare being the preferred contract. This was 
not what the variable was predicted to show. The intuition was based around income determining 
the risk preference of the tenant. However, tenants with low risk preferences could still have high 
incomes. Clearly, higher income does not guarantee a tenant has a higher risk preference, which 
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does not guarantee a cash rent contract. While logical to think higher income results in higher 
risk preference, farmers that take too many risks may not consistently capitalize on the potential 
rewards. With the volatility of recent agricultural production and markets, high risk farmers have 
likely not been experiencing high rewards. Because of this, low risk tenants that decrease their 
risk exposure by choosing cropshare contracts or using less risky farming methods may actually 
be the tenants that have come out with higher incomes. The value of the coefficient means that 
increasing a tenant’s annual household income resulted in an increase of 0.157 in the log odds of 
cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a tenant that’s income stays the same. Converting 
the log odds to an odds ratio results in an odds ratio of 1.169, or 1.169/1. Because this odds ratio 
is greater than one, this means the more likely contract to be chosen is cropshare. The odds ratio 
says that the odds of cropshare contracts being chosen are greater when no change to the tenant’s 
income occurs. The income coefficient resulted in a P-Value of 0.055, meaning the variable is 
statistically significant. 
Table 5.1 Tenant Regression Model Results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
1.num_landlords -0.05545 0.2747 0.840 
1.hay 1.3255* 0.5711 0.020 
1.irr -0.6188* 0.2613 0.018 
income 0.1567* 0.0817 0.055 
region    
20 -0.5726 0.9952 0.565 
30 -0.4688 0.7706 0.543 
40 -0.7586 0.6261 0.226 
50 -0.5812 0.5502 0.291 
60 -1.1607 0.5698 0.042 
70 -0.3226 0.5917 0.586 
80 -0.4909 0.5671 0.387 
90 -0.8533 0.5634 0.130 
Observations   281 
Pseudo R2     0.0527 
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5.2 Landowner Results 
 The result of the second regression, depicting landowner variables, begins with the 
number of leased acres. An increase in acres leased led to a slight increase in the likelihood of 
cash rent contracts being chosen. This coincides with the intuition behind predicting this 
variable’s result. The coefficient is miniscule at -0.00003 and the P-Value is 0.903, meaning this 
variable is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient tells us that increasing the 
number of leased acres resulted in a decrease of 0.00003 in the log odds of cropshare contracts 
being chosen compared to a landowner whose leased acres remains the same. Converting the log 
odds to an odds ratio results in an odds ratio of 0.999, or 1/1.00003. Because this odds ratio is 
less than one, this means cash rent is more likely to be chosen. The odds ratio says that the odds 
of cropshare contracts being chosen are greater when no change to the number of leased acres 
occurs. 
 According to the regression results, increasing the number of tenants causes cropshare 
contracts to be more likely than cash rent. Opposite of what was predicted, this can only be 
explained by the fact that in a cropshare contract, the tenant bears the majority of the workload 
associated with tedious details of managing the lease. All cropshare contracts are typically 
unique in some way, but in most cases, managing a cropshare contract presents more 
responsibilities to tenant than a landlord. This decreases the value of the claim that the increased 
billing and crop dividing tasks associated with cropshare contracts will cause cash rent contracts 
to be chosen when additional tenants involved. While the number of landlords that a tenant 
works with ranged from 1-70, the number of tenants a landowner works with only ranged from 
1-10. In that range, only one landowner worked with ten tenants and the second highest amount 
of tenants dropped to five. Because of this decreased variance in number of leasing partners, I 
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believe the type of contract is less of an issue than if the number of tenants were higher. The 
value of the coefficient means that increasing the number of tenants resulted in an increase of 
0.629 in the log odds of cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a landowner whose 
number of tenants remains the same. Converting the log odds to an odds ratio results in an odds 
ratio of 1.877, or 1.877/1. Because this odds ratio is greater than one, this means the more likely 
contract to be chosen is cropshare. The odds ratio says that the odds of cropshare contracts being 
chosen are greater when the number of tenants increases. 
 Opposite what was predicted, if a landowner lives further than 50 miles from the largest 
lease, cropshare contracts become more likely to be chosen. This variable’s result is difficult to 
explain. Cropshare contracts typically require the landowner have some sort of involvement in 
farm decisions or be aware of day-to-day details. The further a landowner resides from the 
property, the more difficult this becomes. This also requires the landowner to verify the crop 
yield and shares. Not surprisingly, the P-Value for this coefficient is 0.917, meaning this variable 
is not statistically significant. A landowner living further than 50 miles from the largest lease 
resulted in an increase of 0.07 in the log odds of cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a 
landowner resides within 50 miles. Converting the log odds to an odds ratio results in an odds 
ratio of 1.073, or 1.073/1. Because this odds ratio is greater than one, this means the more likely 
contract to be chosen is cropshare. The odds ratio says that the odds of cropshare contracts being 
chosen are greater when the landowner lives further than 50 miles. Only 20 of 162 landowners 
lived further than 50 miles from their largest lease. This simply may not be a large enough pool 
of data to accurately determine the affect of an absent landowner. 
 Another accurately predicted variable was whether or not a tenant is family with the 
landowner. Having a tenant that is family results in cropshare contracts being more likely to be 
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chosen than cash rent contracts. As discussed above, family members tend to be naturally more 
involved in the day-to-day business of the farm, making sense for them to prefer cropshare 
contracts to get a return for their involvement. A landowner’s largest tenant being family resulted 
in an increase of 0.499 in the log odds of cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a 
landowner-tenant relationship that is not family. Converting the log odds to an odds ratio results 
in an odds ratio of 1.647, or 1.647/1. Because this odds ratio is greater than one, this means the 
more likely contract to be chosen is cropshare. The odds ratio says that the odds of cropshare 
contracts being chosen are greater when the landowner and tenant are related. With a P-Value of 
0.271, this result is not very statistically significant. 
 The results of risk preference showed that landowners with more willingness to accept 
financial risk were more likely to prefer cash rent contracts, even though the intuition determined 
that cropshare contracts should be more prominent. This coefficient is also counterintuitive and 
difficult to understand. As seen in the data summary, there were more cash rent contracts used 
for nearly every quantity of risk preference, with only 57 of 277 total respondents using 
cropshare. This variable has a reasonable P-Value of 0.132. Higher risk preference resulted in a 
decrease of 0.138 in the log odds of cropshare contracts being chosen compared to a landowner-
tenant relationship that is not family. Converting the log odds to an odds ratio results in an odds 
ratio of 0.871, or 1/1.148. Because this odds ratio is less than one, this means the more likely 
contract to be chosen is cash rent. The odds ratio says that the odds of cash rent contracts being 
chosen are greater when the landowner is more willing to accept financial risk. 
 The greater the age of the landowner, the more likely the landowner will prefer cash rent 
contracts. The coefficient of age was correctly predicted. As a landowner ages, risk preferences 
tend to decrease. This results in a preference for cash rent contracts, as there is less income 
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variance and less risk than cropshare contracts. With a coefficient of -0.0302 and a P-Value of 
0.104, we see that increasing age results in a decrease of the log odds of choosing cropshare by 
0.0302. This translates to an odds ratio of 0.97, or 1/1.0307. This slight decrease in odds of 
choosing cropshare is fairly significant. The odds of cash rent contracts being chosen are greater 
as the landowner ages. The change in odds is fairly small, indicating that a one-year change in 
landowner age does not result in a drastic change of contract choice, but a change of ten years 
will more largely affect the outcome. 
 
Table 5.2 Landowner Regression Model Results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
leased_acres -0.00003 0.0003 0.903 
num_tenants 0.6296* 0.3793 0.097 
1.distance_residence 0.0702 0.6762 0.917 
1.family 0.4990 0.4538 0.271 
risk -0.1378 0.0914 0.132 
age -0.0302 0.0186 0.104 
region    
20 -1.3688 1.6902 0.418 
30 -1.9861* 1.1097 0.073 
40 -1.8007 1.1205 0.108 
50 -2.3954* 1.0207 0.019 
60 -2.6595* 1.0174 0.009 
70 -1.6138 1.0714 0.132 
80 -1.8375* 1.0207 0.072 
90 -1.6401 1.0333 0.112 
Observations   130 
Pseudo R2     0.1272 
 
 
Half of all variables fell into the transaction cost theory, while half were considered risk-
sharing factors, with the family variable falling into a category of its own, shown in Table 5.3 
and Table 5.4. The number of acres leased qualified for both transaction cost and risk-sharing 
40 
 
theories. Of the five transaction cost variables, two resulted in the predicted contract type. Three 
of five risk-sharing variables came back as predicted. Speaking strictly from a statistical 
significance P-Value set at 0.1, two transaction cost variables were significant and two risk-
sharing variables were significant. However, two (possibly even three) other risk-sharing 
variables were very close to being significant. All things considered, it is clear that both 












Number of Landlords X   X 0.84 
Hay Grown X     0.02 
Irrigation Used  X  X 0.018 












Leased Acres X X  X 0.903 
Number of Tenants X     0.097 
Distance to Residence X     0.917 
Family   X X 0.271 
Risk  X    0.132 






Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to analyze many of the characteristics of tenant-landowner 
relationships to determine which factors made the largest impact on contract choice between 
cropshare and cash rent. This study was intended to educate tenants and landowners in the 
agriculture community on factors and implications to consider when determining which type of 
contract to use. While there are some takeaways from the results, many of the results were 
contradictive of intuition and inconsistent with logic behind predictions. Had the sample size 
been significantly larger, I believe the results would begin to align with expected outcomes. 
 One problem with this study is the fact that the questions are asked about what tenants 
and landowners are currently doing on their farm. Instead, the survey could have been designed 
to analyze characteristics about farms and relationships and apply them towards questions on the 
future. Future research may include questions on satisfaction with current leases and what 
tenants and landowners would change or do different with their next lease. Leases other than 
their largest lease should also be considered to get a better idea of what each tenant or landowner 
uses most often as opposed to one specific lease. 
There are many reasons the results were not as clear-cut and predictable as initially 
thought. Several factors can be present at one time when coming to a decision on contract choice, 
so some details must be set aside in order to determine which characteristic is the most important 
for each relationship. Several details and situations may be occurring that a survey could never 
capture. For example, an older landowner may prefer cropshare contracts, but switches his leases 
to cash rent to make it easier for his family to manage before he passes away. On the other hand, 
a tenant farmer who is approaching retirement may also switch from cropshare to cash rent to 
make it easier for his successors. 
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Every situation is different. One tenant may prefer cash rent because he works with a 
dozen different landowners, even though two of them are relatives with high risk preferences and 
three others are young farmers themselves who desire to be involved in day-to-day decisions. 
Because of situations like this, not every factor is going to match the intuition behind that 
specific characteristic. Although there is sound reasoning as to why the presence of a hay crop in 
a lease should result in a cash rent contract being chosen, other factors may overrule this detail. 
The result of this complexity of relationships can make the survey data appear incorrect or 
illogical. But the truth is, there is no easy way to dissect every tenant-landowner relationship and 
determine the number one driving factor behind contract choice in order to explain all the 
underlying factors that maybe just don’t make sense.  
 The most important information from this study is the conversation about what incentives 
different contracts type provide, and how these implications may be considered and applied, a 
topic that has been popular in similar studies of the past. Although not all of the survey questions 
considered relevant to this study provided logical results, it is important to note that they should 
still be considered in the decision process of contract choice.  
 Additional research could be done to further explore the most influential variables of 
contract choice. The study would be more thorough if a researcher could obtain accurate and 
equal amounts of data from a much larger sample size. I would suggest the survey ask the tenants 
and landowners to rank factors, like those considered in this study, in order of most important or 
influential. I would also ask the tenants and landowners to rank their satisfaction with their 
current lease arrangements. Although the results of this study were inconclusive, this study offers 
good information for tenants or landowners to consider when deciding on future contracts, as 
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The goal of this research is to understand tenants’ and landowners’ opinions 
about agricultural management and their interest in participating in Farm Bill 
programs. Results will help to identify ways to improve programs for long-term 
agricultural profitability and environmental sustainability.  
 
Your opinions matter! Please help us learn from you  
by completing this questionnaire.  
Remember, all individual responses are anonymous and confidential. 
 
 
Thank you for taking our survey. You are helping to inform the design of 
future Farm Bill Programs that better reflect the views and concerns of 




WHO SHOULD FILL OUT THIS SURVEY?  
 
Do you grow grain crops (ex. corn, soybeans, wheat) on land that you own 
or land that you lease?  
¨ NO      
¨ YES    
 
 
Do you consider yourself mainly a landlord (you lease your land to 
another producer) or a tenant/producer (you grow crops on land that you 
own and/or lease)? 
¨ I am mainly  
a landlord  
 
¨ I am mainly  
a tenant      
   
How many total acres do you operate, including land that you own and lease?  
            ______ # of acres of grain crops    ______ # of acres of hay or pasture 
 
 
Please help us complete this project by taking two actions: 
 
Step 1:  After completing this questionnaire, please use the pre-addressed and 
stamped envelope to return the questionnaire to us at:  
331 Waters Hall Manhattan, KS 66506. 
Step 2:  If you lease farmland from someone else, please seal, address, and mail 
the enclosed purple, postage-paid questionnaire to the landowner of 
your largest lease (in acres).  
  
If “NO,” we do not need you to complete this survey, but it is very important 
for us to know that you received this questionnaire. Please return this 
questionnaire to us using the postage-paid envelope provided. Thank you!   
 If “Yes,” please continue to the next question. 
Please complete the enclosed purple “Landowner Survey.”  
Using the postage-paid envelope provided, please send 
this survey to the producer who leases the largest amount 
of land from you.  
 
 
Please answer the following question and then 





If you do not lease land, 
pleasrosed questionnaire. 
       Do you produce crops on land that you own?    
(Please check ‘NO’ if only your tenants (another producers) grow crops on your land.) 
¨   NO     
¨   YES    
1. How many acres of cropland and pastureland do you own and manage 
yourself (do not include land that you lease from someone else)?  
______ # of acres of grain crops         ______ # of acres of hay or pasture 
1. In which county and state is the majority of the cropland that you own and manage 
located?    
      ____________ (County)     _____________ (State) 
List the top 3 crops that you grew in 2017 on acres that you own?  
(Do not include crops that you grow on land that you lease.) 
Crop Name 
Please write double cropped acreage on 
one line, Example: wheat / soybeans  
# Total 
acres 




______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
Fallow land (land not in production) ________ ________ n/a 
 
 
2. What is a typical 5-year crop rotation on the largest field that you own and manage? 
 
______________________________________ 
If ‘NO’, please skip to Section B. 













         What proportion of the cropland you own is tile drained?   ______ percent (%)  
 
Is any land that you own currently enrolled in the 
following programs? No Yes 
If yes, how 
many acres? 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other conservation/environmental program 
(please specify) ___________________________________ 
¨ ¨ _______ 
Other conservation/environmental program 
(please specify) ___________________________________ 
¨ ¨ _______ 
 
  
Do you currently use any of the following management 
practices on cropland that you own (not leased land)? 
No Yes If yes, on how many acres? 
Cover crops during the winter (ex: rye, radish, clover, etc.)  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Filter strips, riparian buffers, or grassed waterways ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation tillage or no-till  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Control structures for subsurface drain water  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Nutrient management plan  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Pollinator or wildlife habitat restoration ¨ ¨ _______ 







SECTION B-1:   FARMLAND YOU LEASE 
3. Do you produce crops on land that you lease from someone else?    
¨   NO      
¨   YES   
4. How many acres of farmland did you lease from someone else in 2017? 
______ # of acres of grain crops         ______ # of acres of hay or pasture 
How many landlords did you have across all of the land that you leased? ____ 
5. How many of those landlords live in the following locations  
(please enter the number of your landlords living at these locations):  
______ live on their own farmland    
______ live off the farm, but in the same county as their farmland 
______ live in the same state, but in a different county than their farmland 
______ live outside of the state in which they own their farmland 
 
SECTION B-2: YOUR LARGEST LEASE 
Please answer the following questions about cropland in your largest lease (in acres).  
à In this section, we want to know about your lease with the most acreage. 
6. How many acres of cropland is in your largest lease? ____________ acres 
1. In which county and state is your largest lease located?                  (Co.) ____(State) 
2. How far away from your house is the land in your largest lease? ____ miles 
Who do you lease this ground from?   
¨ Individual    ¨Family    ¨ Trust     ¨ Other ______________(please specify) 
3. If leasing from an individual, what is your landowner’s age and gender?  
     ______ Approximate age  ¨ Male  ¨ Female  ¨ Prefer not to answer    
4. Is this landowner a retired farmer/rancher?      ¨ Yes        ¨ No   
B5 
If ‘NO’, please skip the next section and move to Section C 
D. 














5. Which best describes your relationship with this landowner?  (check all that apply) 
 ¨ Family    ¨ Friend      ¨ Neighbor     ¨ Acquaintance    ¨ Business only  
How did this landowner obtain this land?  ¨ Inherit   ¨ Purchase  ¨ Not sure  
6. How long have you been leasing from this person/entity? ______ years 
7. How often do you meet or interact with the landowner of your largest lease to 
discuss issues related to the land that you lease from them? 
¨  Less than once per year    
¨  Once per year  
¨  2-4 times per year  
¨  5+ times per year 
8. Contract type for your largest lease: ¨ Cropshare   ¨ Fixed cash  ¨ Flex lease 
  If you pay rent, please answer the 4 questions below.  
a. What was the cropland rent for 2017?     $ _____ per acre of cropland  
b. Number of installments in which rent is paid: ________ 
b. In which year was this rental rate negotiated? __________ 
c. In which year will you negotiate the next rental rate for this lease?  ________ 
List the top 3 crops that you grew in 2017 on land in your largest lease?  
Crop Name 
Please write double cropped 
acreage on one line,  
Example: wheat / soybeans 
# Total 
Acres 








__________________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 
__________________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 
__________________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 










9. What proportion of the cropland in your largest lease is tile drained? ___ (%) 
 
Are any of the following production costs shared between you and the 
landowner of the acreage in your largest lease? 
 
No Yes 
If yes, what % of 
costs are paid by 
the landlord 
yearly? 
Fertilizer ¨ ¨ _______ 
Chemicals (herbicide, fungicide, insecticide, etc.) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other input (please specify)  ___________________ ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other input (please specify)  ___________________ ¨ ¨ _______ 
 




Are you aware that there are federal and state conservation programs that can 
help support the use of environmentally-sustainable management practices on 
land that you lease?          ¨ Yes      ¨ No 
11. How does the landowner of your largest lease feel about conservation programs 
and environmentally sustainable management practices? 
¨  This landowner requires that I use certain conservation management practices.    
¨  This landowner is in favor of conservation, but does not require specific practices.  
¨  This landowner is indifferent regarding conservation management practices.  
¨  This landowner is opposed to me using conservation management practices. 
¨  I do not know my landowner’s motivations regarding conservation management 
practices. 









Is the land in your largest lease enrolled in any of the 
following programs? No Yes 
If yes, how 
many acres? 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other conservation/environmental program 
(please specify) ___________________________________ 
¨ ¨ _______ 
Other conservation/environmental program 
(please specify) ___________________________________ 





Do you use any of the following management practices on 
the land in your largest lease? No Yes 
If yes, how 
many treated 
acres? 
Cover crops during the winter (ex: rye, radish, clover, etc.)  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Filter strips, riparian buffers, or grassed waterways ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation tillage or no-till  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Control structures for subsurface drain water ¨ ¨ _______ 
Nutrient management plan  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Wildlife / pollinator habitat restoration ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other practices: (please specify)_____________________ ¨ ¨ _______ 






SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS 
 
 
We would like to understand your preferences for lease scenarios in which the 
land that you manage is enrolled in the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). 
 
What is the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)?  
The CSP is a voluntary program for working agricultural lands to enhance current stewardship 
efforts. This program is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (USDA NRCS). The CSP helps farmers strengthen their own operations 
while providing benefits to local communities, like improving water quality and wildlife habitat. 
 
CSP participants work with local NRCS conservation planners to decide which conservation 
management practices (“enhancements”) are the best fit for their operation. They are required 
to maintain the initial level of stewardship and adopt at least one new practice to address a 
resource concern.  
 
Participants receive an annual per acre base payment for enrolling the land. Additional funding 
is available to support the adoption of new conservation practices (“enhancements”).  
 
àWhen you answer the questions in this section of the questionnaire, please consider only the 
base payment that you would get for enrolling in the CSP. Keep in mind that, in reality, 




INSTRUCTIONS FOR THIS SECTION: 
• Consider the current rental agreement for your largest lease (the lease that you 
described in Section B-2).  
• On each page of this section, we will describe two alternative lease scenarios.  
o These scenarios are labeled “Scenario A” and “Scenario B.”   
o Under these scenarios, the land you lease would be enrolled in the 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). 
o A ‘Do Not Enroll’ option is also provided. 
• Your task: On each page, please select your most preferred and your 
                   least preferred lease scenario. 
• Note: In this section of the questionnaire, the lease scenarios shown on one page are 
not related to the scenarios shown on another page. Please only compare scenarios 




SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 1/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
50% 100% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 
$4.00/acre to  
producer 
$4.00/acre to  
landowner 




CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
landlord(s) and filling out forms) 
4 hours 4 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred  lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 









SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 2/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
75% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 








CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
landlord(s) and filling out forms) 
16 hours 2 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred  lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 








SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 3/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
75% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 








CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
landlord(s) and filling out forms) 
8 hours 2 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred  lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 








SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 4/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
100% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 








CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
landlords(s) and filling out forms) 
4 hours 16 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred   lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 









SECTION D: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
1. How many years have you been farming? _________(Years) 
 
2. Are/were your parents or grandparents farmers?  
¨ No     ¨ Yes, parents    ¨ Yes, grandparents   ¨ Yes, parents and grandparents 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
¨ Less than 12 years 
¨ High school or GED 
¨ Bachelor’s degree 
¨ Graduate degree 
¨ Associate’s degree and/or technical training  
4. How strongly do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
By their choice of management practices, 
crop farmers can affect the environment.   ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Farmers have a responsibility to manage 
cropland in a way that protects their local 
environment. 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
I feel good about using management 
practices that improve the environment. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Environmental stewardship only makes sense 
on my farm if it also contributes to income. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Environmental stewardship makes sense on 
my farm because my neighbors and other 
family and community members do so. 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Being an environmental steward is an 
important part of my identity. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
The landowner of my largest lease thinks that 
I should participate in conservation programs. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
I work closely with conservation 








12. Please rank the factors that influence your decisions about how you manage 
your owned and leased farmland (1 = most important and  4 = least important) 
Owned      Leased 
______      ______       Financial returns from the property  
______      ______       Environmental stewardship 
______      ______       Other; please specify ________________________ 
______      ______       Other; please specify ________________________  
5. Rate your willingness to take financial risks with respect to your farm operation on 
a 10-point scale, with 1=completely unwilling & 10=completely willing. (Circle one) 
(1)      (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
6. What is your age and gender? ___________(Years)       ¨ Female    ¨ Male           
                                                                                                        ¨ Prefer not to answer  
7. What was your household’s annual gross income in 2016? (mark one box) 
Include pretax income from all sources (salary, wages, social security, rental 
properties, and investment income). This number can be found on IRS Form 1040. 
¨ Less than $25,000 
¨ $25,000 to $49,999       
¨ $50,000 to $79,999        
¨ $80,000 to $99,999 
¨ $100,000 to $149,999 













2. What proportion of your household’s annual gross income was earned through 
farming? (mark one box) 
¨ Less than 25%         ¨ 25%-50%         ¨ 50%-75%        ¨ 75%-100%    
     
9. What is the primary source of income for your household? ___________  











Please help us complete this project by taking two actions: 
 
Step 1:   After completing the questionnaire, please use the pre-
addressed and stamped envelope to return it to us at  
331 Waters Hall Manhattan, KS 66506. 
Step 2:   If you lease farmland, please seal, address, and mail the 
enclosed postage-paid questionnaire to the landowner of 






If you have questions about this research or this questionnaire,  
please contact Dr. Mykel A. Taylor at  























The goal of this research is to understand tenants’ and landowners’ opinions 
about agricultural management and their interest in participating in Farm Bill 
programs. Results will help to identify ways to improve programs for long-term 
agricultural profitability and environmental sustainability.  
 
Your opinions matter! Please help us learn from you  
by completing this questionnaire.  
 
Remember, all individual responses are anonymous and confidential. 
 
 
Thank you for taking our survey. You are helping to inform the design of 
future Farm Bill Programs that better reflect the views and concerns of 




WHO SHOULD FILL OUT THIS SURVEY?  
Are grain crops (ex: corn, soybeans, wheat) grown on land that you own? 
¨ NO  
 
 
¨ YES      
 
 
SECTION A:   FARMLAND YOU OWN 
3. How many acres of cropland and pastureland do you own?  
______ # of acres of grain crops         ______ # of acres of hay or pasture 
7. In which county and state is the majority of the cropland that you own located?    
    ____________ (county)     _____________ (state) 
4. Do you (or someone living in your household) grow crops on land that you 
own?  (Please check ‘No’ if someone else grows crops on your land)   
¨   NO      
¨   YES   
List the top 3 crops grown in 2017 on acres you own and manage (not leased land)  
Crop Name 
Please write double cropped acreage on 
one line, Example: wheat / soybeans 
# Total 
acres 




______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
______________________ ________ ________ ________ 
Fallow land (uncultivated, “resting” land) ________ ________ n/a 
If ‘NO’, please skip to Section B for questions about leased land. 






If “NO,” we do not need you to complete this survey, but it is very important 
for us to know that you received this questionnaire. Please return this 
questionnaire to us using the postage-paid envelope provided. Thank you!   
 
 








What portion of the cropland that you own and manage is tile drained? _____(%) 
Is any of the cropland that you own and manage  
(not leased land) currently enrolled in any of the following 
programs? 
No Yes If yes, how many acres? 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other conservation/environmental program 
(please specify) ___________________________________ 
¨ ¨ _______ 
Do you currently use any of the following management 
practices on cropland that you own  
and manage (not leased land?) 
No Yes If yes, on how many acres? 
Cover crops during the winter (ex: rye, radish, clover, etc.)  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Filter strips, riparian buffers, or grassed waterways ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation tillage or no-till  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Control structures for subsurface drain water  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Nutrient management plan  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Pollinator or wildlife habitat restoration ¨ ¨ _______ 









Do you lease land to a producer who grows crops on that land? 
¨ No  
¨ Yes      
 
SECTION B:   FARMLAND YOU LEASE OUT 
8. How many acres of farmland did you lease out in 2017?  
         ____ # of leased acres with grain crops   ____ # of leased acres in pasture/hay 
9. How many tenants (farmers) pay you to grow crops on your land?    ____ 
Please answer questions B3 – B14 about cropland that you lease out  
to the tenant who sent you this questionnaire. 
13. In which county and state is this leased land located? _______(Co.) ____(State) 
Approximate distance between your residence and the land that you lease out 
to this tenant is: ____ miles   (please enter ‘0’ if you live on or beside this land) 
14. Have you ever lived on the same property as this cropland? ¨ Yes  ¨ No   
15. How did you obtain this land?  ¨ Inherit   ¨ Purchase  ¨ Other ________________ 
16. Which best describes your relationship with this tenant?  (check all that apply) 
¨ Family    ¨ Friend      ¨ Neighbor     ¨ Acquaintance    ¨ Business only  
17. How long have you been leasing to this person/entity? ______ years 
18. How often do you meet or interact with this tenant to discuss issues related to 
the land that you lease to them? 
¨  Less than once per year    
¨  Once per year  
¨  2-4 times per year  
¨  5+ times per year 
B1 
B2 
If “No,” please skip to Section D.   
 













    What type of lease contract do you use?  ¨ Cropshare ¨ Fixed cash ¨ Flex lease 
  If you are paid rent, please answer the 4 questions below.  
a. What was the cropland rent for 2017: $__________ per acre of cropland 
b. Number of installments in which rent received? __________ 
d. In which year was this rental rate initially negotiated? __________ 
e. In which year will you negotiate the next rental rate for this lease?______ 
Please rank the factors that influenced how you selected this tenant  
(1 = most important and  5 = least important) 
___________ Financial returns from the property (rental rate offered) 
___________ Tenant’s environmental stewardship 
___________ Family considerations   
___________ Tenant’s experience and reputation as a reliable farmer 
___________ Other (please specify) ___________________  
19. Are you aware that there are federal and state conservation programs that 
would help support environmentally-sustainable management practices on 
land that you lease out to other farmers?          ¨ Yes    ¨ No 
20. Have you and your tenant discussed enrolling the land you lease out to them 
in conservation programs? 
¨  No, we have not had this type of discussion.    
¨  Yes, we have discussed participating in a conservation program, but we 
decided not to participate. 
¨  Yes, we have discussed participating in a conservation program, and we are 
in the process of enrolling or will enroll in a conservation program during its 
signup period. 
¨  Yes, we have had this discussion, and we currently participate in at least one 
conservation program.  
 
In your lease agreement, do you require your 
tenant to use any of the following conservation No Yes 










(Please check “Yes” or “No” for each practice) 
cost of that practice  
do you pay? 
0% - 100% 
Cover crops during the winter (ex: rye, radish, clover, etc.)  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Filter strips, riparian buffers, or grassed waterways ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation tillage or no-till  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Control structures for subsurface drain water ¨ ¨ _______ 
Nutrient management plan  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Pollinator or wildlife habitat restoration ¨ ¨ _______ 
Other practices: (please specify)__________________ ¨ ¨ _______ 
 
Would you like your tenant to use any of the 
following conservation practices that they do 
not currently use?  
(Please check “Yes” or “No” for each practice) 
No Yes 
If yes, what % of the 
cost of that practice 
would you be 
willing to pay? 
0% - 100% 
Cover crops during the winter (ex: rye, radish, clover, 
etc.)  
¨ ¨ _______ 
Filter strips, riparian buffers, or grassed waterways ¨ ¨ _______ 
Conservation tillage or no-till  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Control structures for subsurface drain water ¨ ¨ _______ 
Nutrient management plan  ¨ ¨ _______ 
Pollinator or wildlife habitat restoration ¨ ¨ _______ 







SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS 
 
 
We would like to understand your preferences for lease scenarios in which your 
land would be enrolled in the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). 
 
What is the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)?  
The CSP is a voluntary program for working agricultural lands to enhance current stewardship 
efforts. This program is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (USDA NRCS). The CSP helps farmers strengthen their own operations 
while providing benefits to local communities, like improving water quality and wildlife habitat. 
 
CSP participants work with local NRCS conservation planners to decide which conservation 
management practices (“enhancements”) are the best fit for their operation. They are required 
to maintain the initial level of stewardship and adopt at least one new practice to address a 
resource concern.  
 
Participants receive an annual per acre base payment for enrolling the land. Additional funding 
is available to support the adoption of new conservation practices (“enhancements”).  
 
àWhen you answer the questions in this section of the questionnaire, please consider only the 
base payment that you would get for enrolling in the CSP. Keep in mind that, in reality, 
additional payments would be available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THIS SECTION: 
• Consider the current agreement for the lease you described in Section B.  
• On each page of this section, we will describe two alternative lease scenarios.  
o These scenarios are labeled “Scenario A” and “Scenario B.”   
o Under these scenarios, the land you lease would be enrolled in the 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). 
o A ‘Do Not Enroll’ option is also provided. 
• Your task: On each page, please select your most preferred and your 
                   least preferred lease scenario. 
• Note: In this section of the questionnaire, the lease scenarios shown on one page are 
not related to the scenarios shown on another page. Please only compare scenarios 






SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 1/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
50% 100% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 
$4.00/acre to  
landowner 




$20.00/acre to  
producer 
CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
tenant(s) and filling out forms) 
4 hours 4 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 









SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 2/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
75% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 
$3.50/acre to 
landowner 




$26.00/acre to  
producer 
CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
tenant(s) and filling out forms) 
16 hours 2 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 








SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 3/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
75% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 
$0.00/acre to 
landowner 




$2.00/acre to  
producer 
CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
tenant(s) and filling out forms) 
8 hours 2 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred  lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 








SECTION C: LEASE SCENARIOS – PART 4/4 
 
Step 1: Review the alternative lease scenarios described below.   
 
Attribute of the lease Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Minimum portion of the total 
operation acreage (land you 
own and lease) that must be 
enrolled in the CSP. 
100% 25% 
Do not enroll 
Division of the CSP  
base payment  
(average payment per acre) 
$0.00/acre to 
landowner 




$19.50/acre to  
producer 
CSP Application Time 
(includes time talking with your 
tenant(s) and filling out forms) 
4 hours 16 hours 
*Note: The lease scenarios discuss only base payments, which represent the average payment per acre.  
Through the CSP, additional payments are available to support the adoption of new practices. 
 Step 2:   Choose your most preferred and your  
least preferred lease scenarios. 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the MOST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
Pick the lease scenario that 
you prefer the LEAST  
(check one box on this row) 
¨ ¨ ¨ 
 









SECTION D: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
Are you and/or your spouse an active or retired farmer?  
¨ No    ¨ Active farmer   ¨ Retired farmer  
8. If yes, how many years of farming experience do you and/or your spouse have?  
# of years of farming experience for:  _____ you      _____ spouse (if applicable) 
9. Are/were your parents or grandparents farmers?  
¨ No     ¨ Yes, parents    ¨ Yes, grandparents   ¨ Yes, parents and grandparents 
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
¨ Less than 12 years 
¨ High school or GED 
¨ Bachelor’s degree 
¨ Graduate degree 
¨ Associate’s degree and/or technical training  
How strongly do you agree with the 
following statements? 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
By their choice of management practices, crop 
farmers can affect the environment.   ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Farmers have a responsibility to manage 
cropland in a way that protects the environment. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
I feel good when management practices that 
improve the environment are used on my land. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Environmental stewardship only makes sense on 
my farm if it also contributes to income. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Environmental stewardship makes sense on my 
farm because my neighbors and other family and 
community members do so. 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
Being an environmental steward is an important 
part of my identity. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
I consider my tenant (who sent this survey to me) 
to be an environmental steward. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 









11. Rate your willingness to take financial risks with respect to your farm on a  
10-point scale, with 1-completely unwilling & 10-completely willing. (Circle one) 
(2)      (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
12. What is your age and gender? ___________(Years)       ¨ Female    ¨ Male    
  ¨ Do not wish to answer  
5. What is your marital status? 
¨ Single         ¨ Married         ¨ Divorced/separated        ¨ Widowed    
13. What was your household’s annual gross income in 2016? (mark one box) 
Include pretax income from all sources (salary, wages, social security, rental 
properties, and investment income). This number can be found on IRS Form 1040. 
¨ Less than $25,000 
¨ $25,000 to $49,999       
¨ $50,000 to $79,999        
 
¨ $80,000 to $99,999 
¨ $100,000 to $149,999 












6. What proportion of your household’s annual gross income in 2016 was earned 
through farming? (mark one box) 
¨ Less than 25%         ¨ 25%-50%         ¨ 50%-75%        ¨ 75%-100%    
     
10. What is the primary source of income for your household? ___________  
 












Please help us complete this project by returning your completed 
questionnaire in the pre-addressed and stamped envelope to: 









If you have questions about this research or this questionnaire,  
please contact Dr. Mykel A. Taylor at  
(785) 532-3033 or by email at mtaylor@ksu.edu  
 
 
 
 
